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NOTES AND COMMENTS
say that the attorney could forget the inconsistency notion in alterna-
tive joinder of plaintiffs.
'It would seem that by the Conger decision, North Carolina,
in the alternative joinder situation, is becoming more liberal, per-
haps even approaching the liberality of the Federal Rules.2" It is
hoped that the court will continue "to reach the conclusions most
likely to' expedite the prompt administration of justice."29
ARCH K. ScHocH IV
Quasi-Contract-Expense of Medical Care of Indigent Parent
During the last illness of a parent, it is not unusual for his
children to assume his medical bills. In Deskovick v. Porzio1 the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, recently con-
sidered an action to recover such expenses brought by two adult sons
against the estate of their father, on an alleged contract for repay-
ment.
The decedent's illness made his sons reluctant to discuss money
matters with him and testimony indicates that they were erroneously
led to believe that their father was unable to pay his medical bills.2
They assumed and paid the bills, allegedly intending to have an
accounting at some unspecified future date. Since the estate left
by the decedent was more than sufficient to cover his medical
expenses3 they sought recovery, basing their action on a theory of
contract implied in fact.' There could have been no such contract,
" 2 BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 533, at
193 (1961). Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was en-
acted in contemplation of procedural economy and provided for, among
other aspects, the alternative joinder of defendants. The authors cite Payne
v. British Time Recorder Co., [1921] 2 K.B. 1, as the forerunner of Rule
20(a). Payne is interesting, therefore, from a historical point of view.
In Payne, plaintiff supplier ordered cards from manufacturer for a cus-
tomer from a sample furnished by manufacturer. On arrival, customer
refused acceptance, alleging variance from the sample. The British court
allowed joinder of customer and manufacturer in the alternative, realizing
that the case, as in Conger, presented one common question: Did the cards
furnished meet the specifications of the sample? This is a case of "mutual
exclusiveness," because recovery against one would definitely preclude re-
covery against the other.
" 260 N.C. 112, 118, 131 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1963).
'78 N.J. Super. 82, 187 A.2d 610 (App. Div. 1963).
2 Id. at 85-86, 187 A.2d at 611-12.
8 Id. at 89, 187 A.2d at 613.
'"Contracts are express when their terms are stated by the parties and
are often said to be implied when their terms are not so stated. The dis-
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however, because the decedent had not known that the plaintiffs were
paying his bills.5 In spite of this, the New Jersey Court reversed
the trial court's order of involuntary dismissal with prejudice, but
remanded the case to be tried on a theory of quasi-contract.
In proposing a quasi-contractual theory of recovery8 the court
felt that the plaintiffs were not guilty of officious intermeddling
which would have barred theif recovery as volunteers.7 This is so
since the plaintiffs were the appropriate persons to discharge their
father's financial obligations. The court found, in essence, unjust
enrichment to the estate of the decedent. That the plaintiffs, at the
time they paid the bills, may have had a gratuitous intent was ruled
of no effect because this gratuitous intent was a product of their
mistaken appraisal of the situation.'
No case squarely in point with Deskovick has been found." In
similar cases, however, there appears to be some uncertainty regard-
ing the proper theory of recovery. This is particularly noticeable
in suits to recover for personal services rendered to the decedent,
tinction is not based on legal effect but on the way in which mutual assent
is manifested." 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 3, at 8-9 (3rd ed. 1957); 1
CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 18 (2d ed. 1963); RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTs § 5
(1932).
'78 N.J. Super. 82, 86-87, 187 A.2d 610, 611.
° "A quasi-contractual obligation is one that is created by the law for
reasons of justice, without any expression of assent and sometimes even
against a clear expression of dissent." 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 19, at 46
(2d ed. 1963); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 3A (3rd ed. 1957). Historically,
quasi-contract relief was awarded under the common counts in the common-
law action of indebitatus assumpsit, on equitable criteria. Archawski v.
Hanioti, 350 U.S. 532 (1956); Herrmann v. Gleason, 126 F.2d 936 (6th
Cir. 1942) ; Dean v. Mattox, 250 N.C. 246, 108 S.E.2d 541 (1959) ; Allgood
v. Wilmington Say. & Trust Co., 242 N.C. 506, 88 S.E.2d 825 (1955) (for
the remedy, not the facts); DAwso N, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 10-26 (1951).
'Schmid v. First Camden Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 130 N.J. Eq. 254, 22
A.2d 246 (Ch. 1941); Whitehead v. Wilson Knitting Mills, 194 N.C. 281,
139 S.E. 456 (1927); Blacknall v. Hancock, 182 N.C. 369, 109 S.E. 72
(1921).
'The Court relied heavily on RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 26 (1936).
"A person is entitled to restitution from another to whom gratuitously and
induced thereto by mistake of fact he has giyen money . . . ." Id. at 116.
Restitution is allowed when the plaintiff has a "mistaken belief in the exist-
ence of facts which would create a moral obligation upon the donor to make
the gift. . . ." Id. at 118.
'In the case of In re Dolgy's Estate, 338 Mich. 567, 61 N.W.2d 649
(1953), the plaintiff had paid hospital expenses incurred by his deceased
father-in-law. Upon the death of the plaintiff's mother-in-law he sued her
estate for reimbursement of her husband's medical bills. The court disallowed
the claim, but indicated that it might have been valid if brought against the
estate of the father-in-law.
[Vol. 42
NOTES AND COMMENTS
where the courts speak of implied contracts without saying more.10
In such suits to recover for personal services a common case is
one in which a close relative is taken into the plaintiff's home. This
relative is usually aged and infirm, and requires a great deal of
personal attention and nursing. At his death the plaintiff seeks
reimbursement from his estate.11 In determining whether or not
to grant recovery, the courts seek to raise a factual presumption of
a contract to pay.:2 When recovery is denied it is usually because
of a lack of a basis for this presumption.' Occasionally courts will
grant recovery in this situation based either on a theory of quasi-
contract, 14 or one of supplying necessaries to an incompetent. 15
"0 Typical of this hazy delineation is Snyder v. Nixon, 188 Iowa 779,
176 N.W. 808 (1920). In that case the plaintiff cared for her aged father
for five years and told him that she intended to charge for her services, to
which he agreed. Disappointed at her inheritance, she sued his executor.
The court said, "The general rule is that, where one renders services of value
to another, with his knowledge and consent, the presumption is that the
one rendering services expects to be compensated, and that the one to
whom the services are rendered intends to pay for the same; and so the
law implies a promise to pay." Id. at 781, 176 N.W. at 809. (Emphasis
added.) In Ellis v. Cox, 176 N.C. 616, 97 S.E. 468 (1918), it was said, "The
jury or a referee may find as a fact an intent on the one part to charge and
on the other to pay for the services, and . . . the law implies a contract to
pay.... ." Id. at 619, 97 S.E. at 469.
" It not infrequently happens that those who are 'old and only in
the way' are bundled off upon some more amiable member of the family,
who uncomplainingly responds without the slightest assistance from the
complacently selfish: and in the contest which ensues, really an effort
to compel contribution based upon the same moral obligation, the selfish
appear consumed with a 'righteous indignation' at the hardness of the
claimant, which has as little sincerity as Judas exhibited in his protest
against the waste of the precious ointment: 'This he said, not that he cared
for the poor, but because he ... had the bag, and bare what was put therein.'
John xii, 6." Jones v. Jones, 129 S.C. 8, 12-13, 123 S.E. 763, 764 (1924).
It is not surprising that the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that there
was a presumption that the plaintiff's services were rendered for a charge.
" Synder v. Nixon, 188 Iowa 779, 176 N.W. 808 (1920) (no relation);
Nesbitt v. Donoho, 198 N.C. 147, 150 S.E. 875 (1929) (father); Henderson
v. McLain, 146 N.C. 329, 59 S.E. 873 (1907) (mother-in-law); Whitaker
v. Whitaker, 138 N.C. 205, 50 S.E. 630 (1905) (grandfather); Jones v.
Jones, 129 S.C. 8, 123 S.E. 763 (1924) (father-in-law).
" Disbrow v. Durand, 54 N.J.L. 343, 24 Atl. 545 (Ct. Err. & App. 1892)
(brother); Frain v. Brady, 48 R.I. 24, 134 Atl. 645 (1926) (no relation).
"'Winkler v. Killian, 141 N.C. 575, 54 S.E. 540 (1906) (semble)
(mother); Conkling's Estate v. Champlin, 193 Okla. 79, 141 P.2d 569
(1943) (no relation).
5 In In re Marine Trust Co., 156 Misc. 297, 281 N.Y. Supp. 553 (Sup.
Ct. 1935), recovery was facilitated by N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 83
which provides essentially that one furnishing necessaries to an incompetent
can recover their value from his estate. It was held in Key v. Harris, 116
Tenn. 161, 92 S.W. 235 (1905), that recovery might be had on the theory of
1963]
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Other similar cases occur when the plaintiff, believing the de-
cedent to be destitute, renders professional services. The courts
have been more forthright in their application or refusal of quasi-
contract in this area.16
The authorities seem to be in conflict in cases where the plaintiff
provides services in the belief that she is legally married to the
decedent. She has rendered her household services because of this
belief, but finds on the husband's death that the marriage was never
legal. Where the parties relied on their marriage in good faith the
courts have generally refused to allow recovery.'1 On the other hand,
one jurisdiction has recognized the mistake as a basis for quasi-
contractual recovery and granted the appropriate relief in this situa-
tion.1
8
Further analysis shows that in most of the personal service
and marriage cases the plaintiff stood or failed on the basis of his
state of mind at the time he conferred benefits on the decedent. If
the plaintiff intended a gratuity he was thereby barred from re-
covery, but if it could be presumed that he intended to charge he
could do so later. Two cases in North Carolina seem to run con-
trary to this general rule.
In -Prince v. McRae9 the plaintiff, a physician, had rendered
services to the decedent. The plaintiff had not made a charge but
later apparently decided to collect from the decedent's estate. The
North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed his recovery, and upheld
the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that an initial gratuitous
furnishing necessaries to an incompetent, where the plaintiff had nursed her
idiot sister over a period of years. This theory was suggested by the court
in spite of the fact that Tennessee had no counterpart of N.Y. PERSONAL
PROPERTY LAW § 83.
A' Recovery was allowed in quasi-contract where the estate of the one
benefited was valued at upwards of $400,000. The court intimated that
there might have been non-disclosure by the decedent. It re Agnew's Will,
132 Misc. 466, 230 N.Y. Supp. 519 (Surr. Ct. 1928). When the estate of
the one benefited amount to only about $1,800, however, the court denied any
recovery. ln re Thomas' Estate, 132 Misc. 842, 231 N.Y. Supp. 93 (Surr.
Ct. 1928).
" Nicely v. Howard, 195 Ky. 327, 242 S.W. 602 (1922) (dictum);
Ogden v. McHugh, 167 Mass. 267, 45 N.E. 731 (1897) (dictum); Cooper v.
Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892 (1888); Cropsey v. Sweeney, 27 Barb.
310 (N.Y. 1857).
" Roberts v. Roberts, 64 Wyo. 433, 196 P.2d 361 (1948). In Sanders
v. Ragan, 172 N.C. 612, 90 S.E. 777 (1916), the decedent had fraudulently
induced the plaintiff to render her household services, and recovery was
allowed on that basis." 84 N.C. 674 (1881).
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intent on his part would defeat the plaintiff. Indeed, the court seems
to have overlooked altogether the question of the plaintiff's original
state of mind.
In Thomas v. Thomasville Shooting Club2" the North Carolina
Supreme Court upheld an instruction that:
If Thomas did not at the time intend to charge for getting up the
leases, and this was known to the defendant, then lie could not
charge and recover for same, but if it was not known to the
defendant that Thomas did not intend to charge, then Thomas
could afterwards sue for and recover for his services in getting
up the leases.2 '
This appears to be a unique rule, enabling the plaintiff to change
his mind in order to recover for a benefit he originally intended as a
gift.
Where one bestows benefits gratuitously with full appreciation
of the facts it should not be the policy of the law to allow him to be
reimbursed,2 as was done in Thomas. But when one has a gra-
tuitous intent because of a misapprehension of attendant circum-
stances, the principal case should govern and that intent alone should
not bar his recovery.
The result of the Deskovick case appeals to the layman's rough
sense of justice. Should such a case arise in North Carolina,2 it
should be recognized as grounded on quasi-contract, and the donor's
original benevolent motives should not defeat him in court, so long
as he was misled in the formulation of those motives.
SCOTT N. BROWN, JR.
Workmen's Compensation-Scope of Immunity from Actions at
Law-The Question of Borrowed Servants
A landowner, constructing a storage plant for use in its business,
employed a crew to lay water and sewer pipe on the construction site.
" 121 N.C. 238, 28 S.E. 293 (1897).
2_ Id. at 240, 28 S.E. at 294.
2 See Meier v. Planer, 107 N.J. Eq. 398, 152 AUt. 246 (Ch. 1930);
Everitt v. Walker, 109 N.C. 129, 13 S.E. 860 (1891); Trustees of the
University v. McNair's Executors, 37 N.C. 605 (1843).
" See Basinger v. Pharr, 225 N.C. 531, 35 S.E.2d 626 (1945). In that
case the plaintiff had brought an action to recover money advanced by him on
behalf of his father for medical expenses, etc., incurred by the latter during
his last illness. In the same action the plaintiff sought recovery of an ad-
vance made directly to the decedent. The lower court non-suited the plain-
tiff as to both items, and he appealed only as to the second, leaving open the
precise question presented by Deskovick.
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